Advancing the Measurement of Organizational Legitimacy, Reputation, and Status: First-order Judgments vs Second-order Judgments:Commentary on “Organizational legitimacy, reputation and status: Insights from micro-level management” by Haack, Patrick & Sieweke, J.
VU Research Portal
Advancing the Measurement of Organizational Legitimacy, Reputation, and Status:
First-order Judgments vs Second-order Judgments
Haack, Patrick; Sieweke, J.
published in
Academy of Management Discoveries
2020
DOI (link to publisher)
10.5465/amd.2019.0103
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Haack, P., & Sieweke, J. (2020). Advancing the Measurement of Organizational Legitimacy, Reputation, and
Status: First-order Judgments vs Second-order Judgments: Commentary on “Organizational legitimacy,
reputation and status: Insights from micro-level management”. Academy of Management Discoveries, 6(1), 153-
158. https://doi.org/10.5465/amd.2019.0103
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Sep. 2021
r Academy of Management Discoveries
2020, Vol. 6, No. 1, 153–158.
Online only
https://doi.org/10.5465/amd.2019.0103 Original Article>>>
C O M M E N T A R Y
ADVANCING THE MEASUREMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL
LEGITIMACY, REPUTATION, AND STATUS: FIRST-ORDER
JUDGMENTS VS SECOND-ORDER JUDGMENTS—COMMENTARY
ON “ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY, REPUTATION AND





As improving the construct validity ofmeasures has
been a fundamental concern in management research
(Aguinis & Edwards, 2014; Aguinis & Vandenberg,
2014), we commend Bitektine, Hill, Song, and
Vandenberghe (2020) for their efforts to develop and
validate individual-level measures for organiza-
tional legitimacy, reputation, and status. These
measurement instruments undoubtedly will be
helpful to advance research on the micro-level an-
tecedents and outcomes of these social evaluations
and will prove instructive for the development of
measures for related evaluations, such as organiza-
tional stigma (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito,
2009; Hudson, 2008) and celebrity (Pfarrer, Pollock,
& Rindova, 2010; Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward,
2006). Althoughwe appreciate the authors’workand
contribution to amicro-foundational agenda in research
on social evaluations, we have some concerns with
regard to their measurement approach. Specifically, al-
thoughBitektine et al. (2020) stress themultilevel nature
of social evaluations, they do not translate this insight
into a measurement instrument that acknowledges
individual evaluators hold both private judgments (“first-
order judgments”) and judgments about the collective-
level judgment (i.e., judgments of the judgments of other
evaluators in a specific reference group, or “second-
order judgments”). These two types of individual judg-
ments reflect different facets of social evaluations and
have different effects on individual behavior, and thus,
researchers need to avoid conflating them within a
measurement instrument. Our commentary seeks to
complement the approach of Bitektine et al. (2020) by
sensitizing readers to the distinction between first-order
and second-order judgments and by developing recom-
mendations for future scale development efforts.
These recommendations are given in a spirit of col-
legiality and with an understanding that progress
in social evaluation research requires the concerted effort
of many researchers over many years (Deephouse,




Several social evaluations have been conceptualized
as multilevel constructs that encompass both individual-
level judgments, which are subject to cognitive con-
straints and biases (e.g., Bitektine, 2011;Mishina, Block,
&Mannor, 2012), and collective-level judgments,which
are derived from the coalescence of individual judg-
ments and grant a focal judgment object (e.g., an orga-
nization or organizational practice), the status of a stable
and enduring social fact (Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgway,
2006). Although the multilevel nature of social evalua-
tions has beenmost intensively discussed in the context
of organizational legitimacy (Bitektine & Haack, 2015;
Suddaby, Bitektine, &Haack, 2017), processes spanning
multiple levels have also received attention in research
on reputation (Ravasi, Rindova, Etter, & Cornelissen,
2018) and status (Piazza & Castellucci, 2014). This body
of work illustrates that social evaluations occur simul-
taneously at the collective level (where perceptions
of appropriateness, standing, and status are created,
shared, and validated) and at the level of the indi-
vidual evaluator, who uses collective perceptions1 Corresponding author.
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to derive their judgment and engages in appropriate
action (Haack & Sieweke, 2018; Johnson et al.,
2006).
The multilevel nature of social evaluations has im-
portant implications for how scholars shouldmeasure
these evaluations at the individual level. Specifically,
we suggest that measurement approaches need to ac-
count for two types of individual-level judgments. The
first of these types is an individual evaluator’s private
judgment about an organization’s legitimacy, reputa-
tion, or status. This type of judgment reflects an eval-
uator’s own assessment of whether the organization is
legitimate, reputable, orofhigh status.Thesecond type
of judgment is an individual evaluator’s judgment of
the judgments of other evaluators in a specific refer-
ence group (e.g., a team, organization, platform, in-
dustry, field, or society at large). That is, individual
evaluators hold judgments about judgments that exist
at the collective level. Drawing on research on judg-
ments and decision-making, we call an evaluator’s
private judgment about an organization’s legitimacy,
reputation, or status a “first-order judgment.” In
turn, we refer to an evaluator’s judgment about the
judgments of other evaluators as a “second-order
judgment.” Distinguishing between first-order and
second-order judgments is important because recent
research has found that second-order judgments are
better predictors of behavior than first-order judgments.
For instance, evaluators’ judgments regarding the
community-level support of energy-saving efforts pre-
dict their own energy-saving efforts but first-order judg-
ments do not (Jachimowicz, Hauser, O’Brian, Sherman,
& Galinsky, 2018). Furthermore, evaluators who believe
that other evaluators hold optimistic stock market
expectations tend to invest more in stocks even after
controlling for first-order judgments (Egan, Merkle, &
Weber, 2014). Importantly, including second-order
judgments in the methodological apparatus of social
evaluation scholars acknowledges that individuals
and their judgments are situated in personal, social,
and historical contexts. Indeed, the “embeddedness”
of evaluators requires the development of a holistic
and contextualized understanding of individual judg-
ment formation, and scholars need to make sure that
the judgment context is not separated or isolated from
micro-levelmeasurement (Albarracin&Shavitt, 2018).
That is, an individual evaluator does not operate as a
“mentalRobinsonCrusoe” (Zerubavel,1997:7); rather,
evaluators continuously assess social norms and the
collective support for a judgment object, meaning that
the context itself constitutes a judgment target.
The idea of distinguishing between two different
types of individual-level judgments has been forcefully
propagated in the realm of legitimacy research, where
scholars have advanced the conceptual distinction
between “propriety belief” and “validity belief”
(Bitektine & Haack, 2015). The term “propriety belief”
corresponds to the notion of first-order judgment and
refers to an individual evaluator’s private endorsement
of a legitimacy object (Suddaby et al., 2017). In turn, the
term “validity belief” reflects the idea of second-order
judgments and denotes an individual evaluator’s
judgment that a legitimacy object is perceived as ap-
propriate by others in a collectivity of individuals,
independently of whether the evaluator privately
endorses the object (Johnson et al., 2006). Hence, al-
though validity can be said to exist objectively as a so-
cial fact and independently of the judgment of a single
evaluator, it enters the judgment formation of an indi-
vidual evaluator as a “validity cue,” which the evalu-
ator uses to form a validity belief (Haack & Sieweke,
2018;Tost, 2011).However, evaluators considerproper
legitimacy objects as desirable and, thus, follow pre-
scriptions voluntarily and sometimes enthusiastically;
compliance with valid legitimacy objects is based on
social obligation and control (Johnson, 2004; Johnson
et al., 2006). Validity beliefs, thus, affect behavior, and
evaluators tend to adapt their propriety beliefs over
time to what they perceive as valid (Haack & Sieweke,
2018; Walker, Rogers, & Zelditch, 1988). Furthermore,
evaluators tend to “silence” propriety beliefs that are
inconsistent with their validity beliefs (Bitektine &
Haack, 2015). Given that social evaluations are char-
acterized by similar psychological and social processes
(Bitektine, 2011), thedynamicswedescribehere for the
context of legitimacy are likely to apply to reputation
and status in a similar fashion. In this view, second-
order judgments are generally used to validate first-
order judgments and, thus, constitute an important
antecedent of individual-level judgment and behav-
ioral change. Furthermore, second-order judgments
may affect whether evaluators conceal or disclose their
first-order judgments.
It seems evident that the individual measures need
to distinguish between these two types of judgments
to prevent uncertainty regarding the construct val-
idity of these measures. Thus, the fact that the mea-
surement instruments developed by Bitektine et al.
(2020) do not make such a distinction impairs their
potential to advance an empirical research agenda
on social evaluations as multilevel constructs. In
the following sections, we develop this critique in
more detail and offer recommendations for future
research.
ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
The first issue is that the measures developed by
Bitektine et al. (2020) cannot discriminate between
first-order judgments and second-order judgments.
The reason for this lies in the ambiguous wording of
the measurement items. For example, although item
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4 of the final measurement scale (“I agree with this
company’s businesspractices”) canbe seenas gaging
an evaluator’s first-order judgment (i.e., an evalua-
tor’s propriety belief about the company’s pragmatic
legitimacy), it is not clear whether the remaining
itemsmeasure first-order judgments or second-order
judgments (see Table 11 in Bitektine et al., 2020). For
instance, item 6 (“this company follows the best
management practices”) may capture an evaluator’s
personal agreement with this statement (first-order
judgment) or an evaluator’s assessment of whether
other evaluators agree with this statement (second-
order judgment). Most items of the scale are char-
acterized by similarly ambiguous wording, thus
introducing a risk of conflating first-order and
second-order judgments. Although prior conceptual
works have highlighted the crucial distinction be-
tween first-order and second-order judgments (e.g.,
Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suddaby et al., 2017),
Bitektine et al.’s (2020) lack of acknowledgment of
this conceptual distinction in their measurement
instrumentsmay be a result of the fact that their scale
development startedwell before scholars introduced
the distinction.
It is important to clarify that the problem of ambigu-
ous wording is not unique to the measurement instru-
ments of Bitektine et al. (2020). In the past, judgment
scales have frequently conflated the measurement of
first-order and second-order judgments, focusing only
on one type or the other, or have conflated both types
of judgments within a measurement scale. In the con-
text of organizational legitimacy, for instance, Chung,
Berger, and DeCoster (2016, Table 3) mix items that
capture private judgments (e.g., “I have a positive
opinion about advertisements for prescription drugs”)
with items that cannot unambiguously discriminate
between first-order and second-order judgments (e.g.,
“theprescriptiondrugcompaniesdoagood jobmaking
their drugs”). Alexiou and Wiggins (2019) explicitly
survey second-order judgments in the context of moral
legitimacy (e.g., “most people would consider this
organization’s practices to be moral”), whereas other
items seem to survey first-order judgments about
pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy (e.g., “I believe that
this organization is necessary”). Likewise, in the con-
text of corporate reputation, Highhouse, Broadfoot,
Devendorf, and Yugo’s (2009) scale measures an indi-
vidual evaluator’s assessment of a company’s general
reputation (e.g., “this company is widely admired and
respected”), thus gaging a second-order judgment,
whereas the scale of Ponzi, Fombrun, and Gardberg
(2011) mixes first-order judgments about a company’s
reputation (“[Company X] is a company that I admire
and respect”) with items that may rather capture
second-order judgments (e.g.,“[CompanyX]hasa good
overall reputation).
It seems advisable for social evaluation scholars to
develop measurement instruments that unambigu-
ously discriminate between first-order and second-
order judgments. Specifically, we argue that the
scale of Bitektine et al. (2020) could be modified and
extended, so that existing items are clearly stated to
address either first-order judgments about an orga-
nization’s legitimacy, reputation, and status or their
corresponding second-order judgments. For in-
stance, item 5 could be separated into “in my per-
sonal view, this company contributes positively to
society” (presumablymeasuring a private judgment)
and “most people would consider that this company
contributes positively to society” (presumably mea-
suring a second-order judgment). In this context,
social evaluation scholars can learn from works in
other disciplines and adapt scales that explicitly
discriminate between first-order and second-order
judgments (e.g., Jachimowicz et al., 2018).
ASKING NO QUESTIONS
Another issue with the measurement instruments of
Bitektine et al. (2020) is that they cannot measure first-
order judgments that are silenced because of desir-
ability effects. Indeed, attitude researchhashighlighted
that explicit self-report instruments may only reveal
those judgments that individual evaluators consider to
be valid (e.g., Petty, Brinol, & DeMarree, 2007). It fol-
lows that self-report instrumentsmayprimarilycapture
second-order judgments (e.g., validity beliefs), whereas
they may be less effective in accurately assessing first-
order judgments (e.g., propriety beliefs). Naturally, this
issue canbe expected to bemore relevant in the context
of controversial organizations or issues, where evalua-
tors are less willing to disclose their first-order judg-
ments and for contexts where evaluators lack the
knowledge or interest to form their own judgments.
Indirect or “implicit” measures of first-order judg-
ments may offer a viable alternative to “explicit”
measures like those developed by Bitektine et al.
(2020). Implicit measures, which include techniques
such as the implicit association test and evaluative
priming, are designed to assess automatic judgments
that are not necessarily linked to explicit self-report
measures but nevertheless may shape evaluators’
behavior (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). As discussed by
Alexiou and Wiggins (2019), Humphreys and Latour
(2013)were among the first touse an implicitmeasure
to examine first-order judgments in the context of
social evaluations research. Specifically, they infer-
red cognitive legitimacy based on the time evaluators
needed to categorize an organization into a preexist-
ing category. They concluded that evaluators who
judge an organization to have greater cognitive legit-
imacy are able to categorize it more quickly, thus
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exhibiting faster response times. Similar procedures
for assessing first-order judgments about the socio-
political legitimacy, reputation, or status of an orga-
nization appear feasible andmay be able to overcome
the potential weaknesses of explicit self-report mea-
sures. So far, social evaluation scholars have not
capitalized on the use of implicit measures, but we
see great promise for doing so in the future.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
JUDGMENT AGGREGATION
The distinction between first-order and second-
order judgments is consequential for the aggregation
of individual-level measures into collective-level con-
structs. Considering this distinction gives rise to the
question of what is the content of such aggregation.
That is, which type of individual judgment should be
aggregated into a collective-level construct—the eval-
uators’ first-order judgments about the legitimacy,
reputation, or status of an organization, or the evalua-
tors’ second-order judgments (i.e., their assessment of
howothers evaluate the organization)? For instance, in
the context of legitimacy, does the collective-level
construct of validity reflect the consolidation of eval-
uators’ propriety beliefs or the consolidation of their
validity beliefs? Addressing this question is important,
as behavioral consequences for the organization (e.g.,
whether it is able to grow and attract resources) may
stem from the consolidation of evaluators’ first-order
or second-order judgments.
As discussed earlier, evaluators tend to adapt or
silence their first-order judgments when they per-
ceive them tobe inconsistentwith their second-order
judgments and to develop behavioral dispositions
that are in line with their second-order judgments
(Haack & Sieweke, 2018). In such circumstances, it
seems justifiable to aggregate second-order judg-
ments into a collective-level construct. In turn, in
contexts where evaluators are less constrained and
more willing to disclose their first-order judgments,
evaluators are more likely to take action based on
these judgments, therefore warranting the aggrega-
tion of first-order judgments into a collective-level
construct. Interestingly, research on organizational
climate has also struggled with the question of
whether direct consensus models (which are similar
to aggregating first-order judgments) or referent-shift
consensus models (which are similar to aggregating
second-order judgments) represent the more appro-
priate composition method. A recent meta-analysis
(Wallace, Edwards, Paul, Burke, Christian, & Eissa,
2016) concluded that both composition methods are
feasible and found only small differences in the ef-
fect sizes. However, an important assumption that
needs to be proven for the aggregation of first-order
judgments into a valid collective-level construct is
thatmost evaluators do not suppress or falsely report
their first-order judgments.
We suggest that our considerations regarding the
appropriate measurement and aggregation of indi-
vidual judgments predisposes the analytical sepa-
ration of two collective-level constructs (i.e., one
based on the aggregation of first-order judgments and
one based on the aggregation of second-order judg-
ments). For instance, for the context of legitimacy,
we consider it important to acknowledge that an or-
ganization can be valid, and thus, it can induce a
sense of obligation that guides behavior, when its
acceptance is “assumedly shared” by others in a so-
cial group (Suchman, 1995: 574). In other words,
validity does not necessarily require consensus in
terms of propriety beliefs but merely consensus in
terms of validity beliefs. In this view, validity can be
based on “false consensus,” or a misperception of the
prevalent propriety belief. That is, even if most indi-
vidual evaluators hold unfavorable propriety beliefs
about an organization (which means that only a few
evaluators privately endorse it), the organization can
still be highly valid if evaluators falsely assume that
most people in their reference group hold favorable
proprietybeliefs about it.Thebelief in thevalidityof an
organization (or any other legitimacy object) can, thus,
exist as a social fact and can guide behavior even in the
presence of heterogeneous or largely unfavorable pro-
priety beliefs, especially when the network ties among
the members of a group are weak and communication
is sparse, which makes it difficult for individual eval-
uators to detect the actual propriety beliefs of other
evaluators (Clemente & Roulet, 2015; Zhu&Westphal,
2011). The distinction between “actual” and “appar-
ent” consensus into two unique collective-level con-
structs may advance scholarly understanding of the
diffusion of misperceptions and unpopular norms
(Centola, Willer, & Macy, 2005) and may also help to
better account for the occurrence of sudden or unan-
ticipated institutional change (Clemente & Roulet,
2015). We conjecture that the relevance of these con-
siderations is not limited to the realm of legitimacy but
extends to reputation, status, and other social evalua-
tion constructs.
CONCLUSION
The study of Bitektine et al. (2020) successfully
advances a micro-foundational research agenda on
social evaluations; however, further work remains
to be carried out. When developing individual
measures for social evaluations, researchers must
discriminate first-order judgments from second-
order judgments and may want to explore implicit
instruments for measuring first-order judgments.
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Furthermore, they need to carefully consider which
type of individual-level judgment can be meaning-
fully aggregated into a collective construct.
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